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In this paper we argue that an important and not-yet analyzed determinant of the
observed heterogeneity of government debt across countries is the interaction between
political conflicts and transparency of institutions. In the empirical part of the pa-
per we show that whereas these two variables, per-se, are not significant determinants
of observed debt levels across countries, their interaction is a key factor to explain
debt-levels heterogeneity. Specifically, political conflicts imply higher borrowing only in
non-transparent economies. In the theoretical model we propose a rationale for this ef-
fect. When the incumbent has preferences over distribution of resources across different
groups, in a transparent economy political uncertainty leads to precautionary savings.
Nevertheless, assuming that in more non-transparent economies the probability of an
incumbent to be re-elected is more strongly a function of current economic conditions,
then political uncertainty leads to borrowing incentives. We structurally estimate the
two frictions in our model (political conflict and lack of transparency) by using their
macroeconomic implications. Then, we compare the estimated frictions with the prox-
ies for political conflict and lack of transparency in the data and we find a significant
relationship, which supports our theory.
JEL Classification: E2 - F41 - D72
Keywords: Sovereign Debt, Quality of Institutions, Saving decision, Political uncer-
tainty.
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The macroeconomic literature has largely investigated the cross-country heterogeneity of
macroeconomic variables, especially considering business cycle statistics, namely the variabil-
ity of output, consumption, investment, and interest rates; however, the heterogeneity and
the determinants of debt dynamics across countries is a much less examined issue.1 In this
paper we argue that an important and not-yet analyzed determinant of debt incentives is the
interaction between political conflicts and transparency of institutions. The rationale behind
this effect stems from how these two variables affect strategical political incentives to borrow.
Our contribution is both empirical and theoretical. First, from an empirical point of
view, we analyze how our two institutional variables of interest, namely political conflicts
and lack of transparency, affect observed public debt for a comprehensive set of economies.
We focus on these two variables for the following reasons. Political conflicts aim to capture
the degree of disagreement within a country, which affects the opportunity cost of not-being
elected. We proxy political conflicts with measures of fractionalization within a country,
as supported by a large body of research.2 In a nutshell, in our paper political conflict
captures how much at stake there is in an election. Our second variable of interest is lack of
transparency, which aims to capture the difficulties for voters to recognize the true ability of
policy makers, and, therefore, their propensity to base their electoral preferences on recent
economic performance. This effect could arise for several reasons: for example, governments
might lack of transparency in communicating their policies; also, corruption might affect
policy makers’ credibility; especially in emerging and developing countries governments might
restrict the freedom and independence of the media and, more generally, freedom of expression
is not guaranteed.3
Our main empirical result shows that, whereas political conflict and lack of transparency,
per-se, are not significant determinants of observed debt levels across countries, their interac-
tion is a key factor to explain debt-levels heterogeneity. To test this hypothesis we perform
cross-country regressions of debt-to-GDP data using our proxies of political conflict and lack
of transparency. Our sample includes 66 countries that are heterogeneous in terms of eco-
1See Semlali (1997) and Uribe (2013) for a review.
2According to Easterly and Levine (1997) ethnic diversity tends to slow growth by making more difficult
to agree on the provision of public goods and policies. Alesina et al. (2001) argue that fractionalization is
relevant in explaining the diversity of public policies in the US and in Europe. They argue that European
countries are more generous to the poor relative to the US as a result of racial heterogeneity in the US and
American political institution.
3As suggested by Rogoff and Sibert (1988), the existence of information frictions on the ability of the
policy maker implies voters will make decisions according to the state of the economy (c.d. retrospective
voting behaviour), as a result of a signal extraction game between voters and politicians.
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nomic development: we have included OECD economies, emerging economies, and developing
economies. Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, the simple regression of debt
levels on political conflict and lack of transparency yields non-significant (but positive) coef-
ficients: this means that political conflict, per-se, does not contribute significantly to increas-
ing debt. Second, and more importantly, when we add an interaction term between the two
variables, the interaction term is positive and significant, while the coefficient associated to
political conflict changes the sign and become negative. This implies that if political conflict
increases in a transparent economy (low lack of transparency values), its effect on debt is
negative (which means it incentivizes saving); on the contrary, in a non-transparent economy
(high lack of transparency values) large political conflicts induce borrowing (more debt). This
result is robust to adding additional control variables and to a more complete second order
regression.
The rationale behind these findings stems from the following intuition. As pointed out
in Alt and Lassen (2006) and Shi and Svensson (2006), when governments might have unob-
servable characteristics, in non-transparent economies voters must rely simply on economic
conditions as a possible signal about the quality of the government. The incentives to bust
economic condition by using of public debt is a function of the opportunity cost of losing
elections, which relates to the degree of political conflict. In a transparent economy, inflating
economic performances via debt is not beneficial since voters can disentangle this effect from
the true ability of the government. On the contrary, when the economy is non-transparent,
voters might be more likely to show support to the current government if the country enjoys
larger amount of resources, thus increasing incentives to borrow for the incumbent.
In our theoretical contribution, we propose a rather simple model that can explain our
empirical findings. The starting point is a conventional open-economy real business cycle
model similar to Uribe and Yue (2006): an economy is endowed with an exogenous and per-
sistent stream of output and the incumbent makes intertemporal decision on debt to smooth
consumption over time. We add political uncertainty into this model: in each period the
incumbent has a certain probability to be re-elected. In addition, we include also political
conflict and transparency. Regarding political conflict, similarly to Alesina and Tabellini
(1990b), parties have preferences over distribution across different groups and decide the allo-
cation of consumption according to these preferences. A single parameter, which we refer to
as the degree of political conflict, determines how unequally the incumbent would like to split
aggregate resources. The higher is the degree of political conflict, the larger are the benefits
from being in power.4
4We believe that the assumption on political frictions operating through redistribution of resources is
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We emphasize that when political uncertainty is characterized by a constant probability
to be reelected, political conflicts per-se are not necessarily able to produce borrowing in-
centives. For example, when the incumbent has Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)
preferences with risk aversion coefficient greater than one, political uncertainty and political
frictions alone, i.e. in a transparent economy, induce precautionary savings. In fact, with
these preferences, the incumbent would like to transfer resources from her incumbent-state to
a possible future opposition-state, thus leading to incentives to postpone consumption. This
feature is consistent with our empirical result that political conflict, in a transparent economy,
has a negative sign on its relationship with debt.
Then, we introduce the feature of lack of transparency. We assume that in non-transparent
economies, the probability of an incumbent to be re-elected is more strongly a function of
current economic conditions.5 Empirical studies, such as Pacek and Radcliff (1995), Lewis-
Beck and Stegmaier (2000), and Bartels (2013), support the notion that economic performance
is a crucial determinant of electoral outcomes and political approval. In our model we show
that political conflict together with retrospective voting induces borrowing incentives for the
incumbent. Intuitively, when the electorate is particularly sensitive to economic conditions,
an incumbent is willing to borrow in order to increase current consumption to gain political
advantage against the opposition.
Finally, we bring the model to the data. We use the theoretical predictions of our model
on a set of observable macroeconomic and political variables to estimate both the degree of
transparency and political conflict that are able to match these moments. Recall the two main
theoretical findings: first, without lack of transparency, stronger political conflict lead to larger
saving incentives; second, when lack of transparency is instead high, stronger political conflict
leads to larger borrowing incentives. These predictions have effects on average debt, average
length of government spells, consumption variance, and trade-balance variance. Therefore, we
make use of these predictions to structurally estimate the degree of transparency and political
conflict for each country that it is able to make these model predictions as close as possible
to their observed counterpart. This strategy yields a cross section set of estimates for our
two parameters of interest, the degree of political conflict and lack of transparency. Notice
that we use only observed macroeconomic moments to estimate these frictions, without using
realistic. There is broad evidence that economic inequality is also related to conflicting preferences over
redistribution especially in countries where ethnical heterogeneity is large (see Horowitz (1985)).
5Our reduced-form way to model lack of transparency can be justified by the concept of retrospective
voting, as introduced by Nordhaus (1975), in which voters myopically reappoint the incumbent conditionally
on current economic conditions, and then extended in Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990), which
rationalize this behaviour in a rational expectation model by means of a multidimensional signaling game,
where parties have time-persistent preferences and voters try to extract the competence of the incumbent by
observing economic conditions.
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any information about the observed degree of these frictions. Hence, the second natural step
is to investigate how our estimates correlate, in the cross-section, with observed proxies of
political conflict and lack of transparency. Our finding can be summarized as follows. First,
the model strongly support the existence of these frictions. Second, the estimated frictions
positively and significantly relate to their data counterparts. Third, once one takes into
account possible sources of bias, coming from observing imperfect measures of the frictions
and from estimating the frictions with a stylized model that might ignore important effects,
the positive relationship becomes even stronger. Hence, we are confident that the mechanism
proposed in our model can rationalize the empirical importance of the interaction between
political conflict and lack of transparency as observed in the data.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we validate the main theoretical
results on the cross section of debt to output ratios across countries. In Section 3 we present
our model and the political economy environment, In Section 4 we describe the estimation
strategy and we test the relevance of our model. In Section 5 we present the final remarks.
2 Transparency, Political Conflict, and Debt
There are two key variables in our analysis: lack of transparency and political conflict.
The goal of this paper is to show how these two variables interact with public debt in the
data, and then to provide a theoretical explanation for that interaction using a model.
2.1 Lack of Transparency
In our empirical analysis we measure lack of transparency, henceforth simply transparency,
in a given country using the average of two different proxies. The first proxy is the variable
Functioning of Government (FOG), which examines to what extent the freely elected head of
government and a national legislative representative determine the policies of the government;
if the government is free from pervasive corruption; and if the government is accountable to
the electorate between elections and operates with openness and transparency. The second
one is the variable Freedom of Expression and Belief (FEB), which measures the freedom and
independence of the media and other cultural expressions; the freedom of religious groups to
practice their faith and express themselves; the academic freedom and freedom from extensive
political indoctrination in the educational system; and the ability of the people to engage in
private (political) discussions without fear of harassment or arrest by the authorities. Coun-
tries are graded from the worst to the best. Both proxies have been rescaled to belong in
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the interval [0, 1]. See Appendix A for a description of the data sources. Our benchmark










, where FOGi and FEBi are the value observed in the
first year available, i.e. 2005.6 Therefore, the higher is the value of this variable, the worst is
the transparency in that country (Swaziland, value equal to 0.91), and the lower is its value,
the highest is the transparency in that country (Australia, value equal to 0).
2.2 Political Conflict
The second variable of interest is political conflict, henceforth simply conflict. The exis-
tence of a conflict between individuals or groups in a given country generates different distribu-
tion of aggregate resources benefiting the group in power. Measuring this type of conflict is not
straightforward from the data. Following Easterly and Levine (1997), we define the variable
political conflict for country i, Conflicti, with ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionaliza-
tion, by using the one-time measure as computed by Alesina et al. (2003).7 Fractionalization
expresses the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the population will not
belong to the same ethnic/linguistic/religious group. The existence of different groups per-se
does not imply that a conflict in the economy exists, but it is strongly correlated with it.8
2.3 Transparency, Political Conflict, and Debt
In this section we investigate whether political conflict and lack of transparency are im-
portant determinants of the level of debt observed in a country. We show a novel finding,
not yet highlighted in the literature: whereas these two measures do not have a significant
impact, per-se, their interaction is an important driver of debt accumulation. In fact, we
find that countries in which both political conflict and lack of transparency are high tend to
accumulate larger levels of debt. However, in more transparent economies, the larger degree
of political conflicts leads to more savings.
To test this hypothesis formally, and in order to control for additional country character-
istics, we perform cross-country regressions of debt-to-GDP data using our proxies of political
6As the two variables do not vary much in the sample available, the results of this section hold if we instead
consider their average value in the sample period, as shown below in one of the robustness exercise.
7Time series variation is not available for this variable, but this should not be a crucial limitation of our
analysis, as ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization is likely to move very slowly over time.
8Alesina and Drazen (1991) argue that a war of attrition between interest groups can postpone macroe-
conomic stabilization. In Alesina and Spolaore (1997) a public good like a school brings less satisfaction to
everyone in an ethnically diverse situation because of the different preferences for language of instruction,
curriculum, location, etc. So less of the public good is chosen by society, lowering the level of output or
growth.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of benchmark variables
Debt/GDP Conflict Lack of Transp. Interaction
mean 0.53 0.17 0.28 0.05
0% 0.12 0.01 0.0 0.00
25% 0.32 0.09 0.04 0.00
50% 0.51 0.15 0.20 0.03
75% 0.70 0.22 0.45 0.07
100% 1.36 0.42 0.91 0.34
Note: In this Table we present the summary statistics of the benchmark measures of Debt-to-GDP ratio, Conflict,
Lack of Transparency, and interaction among the latter two variables. Debt/GDPi is calculated as the sample
average in country i (see Appendix 8). Lack of transparency is the first observation available in the sample period
available, i.e. 2005-2008, while the measure of political conflict is the only observation available, as it is a one-time
measure as computed by Alesina et al. (2003).
conflict and transparency. Specifically, we estimate the following cross-section regression:
Di = κ0 + κ1Conflicti + κ2(Conflicti ∗ Transpi) + κ3Transpi + κJXJ,i + εi, (1)
where Di denotes the average level of debt-to-GDP level of country i in the samples available,
measured as a fraction; Conflicti and Transpi are the proxy for political conflict and lack of
transparency, as discussed in the previous section; XJ,i denotes possible additional regressors;
and εi are regression errors that are assumed to be independent and identically distributed.
9
As for the dependent variable, debt-to-GDP, we use the sample average over the period for
each country, reported in the first column of Table 8 in Appendix A.7. Regarding explanatory
variables, our benchmark approach is to take the first observation available for each country to
reduce the potential endogeneity among variables in the regression. However, we also check
the robustness of our results to include explanatory variable as sample averages, in one of
the different specifications. Summary statistics of debt, political conflict and transparency
are provided in Table 1, while a plot of the distribution of debt-to-GDP ratio, transparency,
conflict, and their interaction is displayed in Figure 1. A detailed description of data sources
can be found in Appendix A.
We first provide a taxonomy of the relationship between debt, transparency, and conflict,
by showing statistics about average debt-to-GDP for four classes of countries, identified by
having lower or higher conflict/lack of transparency than the median values. As Table 2
displays, conditional on having low conflicts, less and more transparent countries have similar
levels of debt to output ratios. On the contrary, higher lack of transparency is related to
higher level of debt for countries with high level of political conflict. Finally, a higher degree
of conflicts implies less debt for more transparent countries, but more debt in less transparent
9The limitation of the dataset and the slow-moving nature of lack of transparency does not allow to explore
the time variation of that variable; in fact, among all the years and all the countries available we observe only
63 instances of changes of transparency.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Benchmark variables
Debt/GDP




































Note: In this Figure we plot the cross-section distribution of the benchmark measures of Debt-to-GDP ratio, Conflict,
Lack of Transparency, and interaction among the latter two variables. Debt/GDPi is calculated as the sample average
in country i (see Appendix 8). Lack of transparency is the first observation available in the sample period available,
i.e. 2005-2008, while the measure of political conflict is the only observation available, as it is a one-time measure
as computed by Alesina et al. (2003).
ones.
Table 2: Transparency, Political Conflicts, and Debt: Data
Lack of Transparency
Below median Above median
(more transparent) (less transparent)
Conflict
Below median
Avg. Debt/GDP = 0.52 Avg. Debt/GDP = 0.51
# Countries = 19 # Countries = 14
(Chile, Finland, Japan) (Romania, Honduras, Bangladesh)
Above median
Avg. Debt/GDP = 0.45 Avg. Debt/GDP = 0.63
# Countries = 14 # Countries = 19
(USA, Belgium, Philippines) (Thailand, Kenya, Guatemala)
Note: In this table we report average debt-to-output ratio, the number of countries and the names of three countries
that belong to one of the four group identified by having higher or lower political conflict (by rows) and lack of
transparency (by columns). The thresholds that identify the four groups are the median of the two variables.
Debt/GDPi is calculated as the sample average in country i (see Appendix 8). Lack of transparency is the first
observation available in the sample period available, i.e. 2005-2008, while the measure of political conflict is the only
observation available, as it is a one-time measure as computed by Alesina et al. (2003).
Estimation results for the model in (1) are reported in Table 3. In regression (1) we display
the estimates of the coefficients of the univariate relationship between debt and political
conflict. Without any other explanatory variable, the sign is positive but not significant. This
means that political conflict, per-se, does not contribute significantly to increasing debt. In
regression (2) we add lack of transparency: the coefficient associated to this variable is positive
and significant, but notice that even when adding this regressor political conflict is still positive
and not significant. In regression (3) we first test the mechanism proposed in this paper:
compared with regression (2) we have included an interaction term between political conflict
and transparency. The interaction is positive and significant, while the coefficient associated to
8
political conflict changes the sign and becomes negative. This implies that as political conflict
increases the effect on debt is negative (which means it incentivizes saving) in a transparent
economy (low lack of transparency values), while large political conflicts induce borrowing
(more debt) in a non-transparent economy (high lack of transparency values). To give an
example, if a country had a lack of transparency equal to zero (very transparent), the marginal
effect of conflict on debt would be negative (thus, inducing savings) and equal to κ1 = −0.53.
If that country instead had the maximum observed level of lack of transparency equal to 0.916
(non-transparent), the effect of conflict on debt would be positive (thus, inducing borrowing)
and equal to κ1 + 0.916κ2 = 1.55.
10
The results are robust to using different specifications and adding controls. In regression
(4) we also include additional regressors that have been shown in the literature to be important
determinant of debt levels. Variable Credit is domestic credit provided by the financial sector
and measures the soundness of the financial system: when this proxy increases, the government
can borrow more easily from national and foreign investors. Energy is measured as energy
production per capita: countries that produce energy do not need to rely on international
energy markets to satisfy energy demand. The coefficient associated to GDP per capita tells
that governments of richer countries have lower incentive to borrow. The variable Growth,
which measures annual growth rate of GDP per capita, tells whether fast growing countries
have borrowing or saving incentives. Majoritarian is a dummy variable that takes value
one if the country had a majoritarian system in the first period available. According to
Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002) the existence of a majoritarian electoral system has an impact on
fiscal policy. Openness is computed as export plus imports over GDP. Its positive coefficient
signals that more open countries are also more financially integrated. Pop>65 measures the
percentage of the population over 65 years old and it proxies public spending in social security.
In regressions (3cl) and (4cl) we cluster the standard errors at economic area levels for the two
main benchmark models: here the standard errors are more conservative, but the interaction
term remains significant at 10%.11 In regression (5) we included additional squared terms to
control for additional non linearities. Given the quadratic terms it is not immediate to observe
the change in sign of the effect of transparency. Doing a similar example as before, a country
like Brazil (with a conflict level similar to the average and equal to 0.2) would experience a
10We can compute the economic magnitude of these estimate by computing the change in debt to output
ratio, measured as a fraction, from moving from the minimum to the median level of conflict observed in the
data (that is from 0.01 to 0.15) both for the most and least transparent economy, as an example. In the first
case the change in debt to output ratio would be equal to -0.07, while in the second case it would be 0.22.
These numbers should be taken only as an indicative measure as political conflict, which is a fractionalization
measure, is unlikely to vary that much in a given country.
11We split the countries in the following areas: North Africa & Middle East, Latin & Central America,
Asia, Eastern Europe, Africa and Developed countries.
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negative marginal effect of political conflict on debt, equal to -0.59, if its transparency value
were zero, and a positive marginal effect, equal to 1.32, with the highest transparency value.12
In regression (6) we add squared terms of Conflict and Transparency to the specification
in (4). In regression (7) we include area dummies to control for latitude effects. Regression
(8) only differs from (7) in the way the regressors are calculated. While in all the other
cases each variable enters as the first available observation for each country, here the vari-
able is calculated as an average in the available period. In this way average GDP growth
becomes more significant in the regression, but the interaction term is still strongly signifi-
cant. Regression (9) has the same specification of model (6), but we restrict the analysis to
developing countries: our results appear stronger in this case, as the size (in absolute value)
of the coefficients associated to political conflict, transparency and their interaction is larger.
Furthermore political conflict becomes now more significant. Model (10) differs from (7) just
for the dependent variable: debt-to-GDP ratios are calculated from 1990 onward to focus on
the period when emerging markets started integrating in the global economy. Also in this case
the coefficients associated to our variables of interests are robust in size and sign. Models (11)
to (13) differ from (7) for the proxy of lack of transparency used in the analysis. The results
seem to be robust to the choice of the transparency index: in regression (11) transparency is
defined from Functioning of Government described above, while in regression (12) we used
Freedom of Expression and Belief. In model (13) we define transparency as the average of 7
different proxies. In addition to the proxies included in the benchmark definition of trans-
parency we have added: proxies of freedom of the press and pressures over media content
exerted by politics, state laws or more generally influence coming from the economic environ-
ment of the media; a measure of political participation (that measures the right of people to
freely organize in political parties); and a measure of rule of law (as a measure of reliability
of the judiciary system). Finally, in model (14) we exclude countries that have been through
a major regime switch from dictatorship to multi-partisan election.13 The five countries with
such a regime change are: Burundi, Hungary, Jordan, Nepal, and Romania.
12As the regression contains second order terms, the marginal effect for political conflict is a function of the
conflict level. That is why for the example with picked a country with a value of political conflict equal to the
average.
13We identify the regime switcher using the variable No Parties Allowed, (NPA) computed by Institutions
and Elections Project, and that in any year takes value of 1 if no parties are allowed and 0 otherwise.
The criterion we use to isolate the regime switcher is that a country that starts in a dictatorship (NPA=1)



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4 Transparency of institutions or unsophisticated voters?
One might wonder whether the effect we found for our measure of lack of transparency,
which aims to capture institutional frictions that create difficulties for voters to recognize the
true ability of policy makers, can be instead interpreted as voters’ lack of sophistication, which
in contrast should be interpreted as voters’ inability to evaluate the political and electoral
process, regardless the degree of transparency of the institutions. In order to shed lights on
these two interpretations, we first create a Lack of Sophistication index, as an average of two
different proxies.
The first proxy is the variable Social Globalization, and it is measured by three categories
of indicators; (i) personal contacts, such as telephone traffic and tourism; (ii) information
flows, e.g. number of Internet users; and (iii) cultural proximity, e.g. trade in books and
number of Ikea warehouses per capita. The second proxy is the variable Education, and it
is measured as number of students at universities or other higher education institutions per
100,000 inhabitants of the country.
The measure of lack of sophistication is the average of the two proxies and it is rescaled
to belong in the interval [0,1]. Hence, a country with value of lack of sophistication equal to
zero is the most sophisticated (Latvia), whereas a country with value equal to one is the least
sophisticated (Indonesia). See Appendix A.4 for a description of the data sources. Figure 2
displays the relationship between our benchmark measure of lack of transparency and lack
of social globalization, lack of education, the overall lack of sophistication index, as well as
the relationship between the interaction between lack of transparency and political conflict
and lack of sophistication and political conflict. Although obviously positively correlated the
transparency and sophistication are far from perfectly correlated.14
If we were to estimate the same empirical regression in equation (1) with Lack of Sophis-
tication instead of with Lack of Transparency, would we obtain the same results? And if
we, instead, were to add sophistication as a control, would the results in the previous section
change? Table 4 helps answering these questions. Model 1 reports, for reference, the relation
between debt and political conflict. Model 2s adds lack of sophistication: the results are very
similar to Model 2 of Table 3, both in terms of sign and magnitude. However, as Model 3s
displays, the interaction between political conflict and lack of sophistication is insignificant.
This confirms that our results in the previous section are related to transparency of institu-
tions rather than unsophisticated voters. Model 4s and Model 5s support this finding, as our
parameter of interest, that is the the interaction between political conflict and transparency
14The correlation between the two indexes is 0.46, while the correlation between the interactions with
political conflict is 0.74.
12
remains large and positive when controlling for lack of sophistication and its interaction with
conflict, while the interaction between political conflict and lack of sophistication is very close
to zero.15
Figure 2: Sophistication and Transparency
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Note: In this Figure we display the relationship between our benchmark measure of lack of transparency (x-axis)
and lack of social globalization, lack of education, the overall lack of sophistication index (y-axis, panel north-west,
north-east, and south-west), as well as the relationship between the interaction between lack of transparency and
political conflict (x-axis) and lack of sophistication and political conflict (y-axis, panel south-east).
Table 4: Sophistication, Transparency, Political Conflicts, and Debt
Model 1 Model 2s Model 3s Model 4s Model 5s
Constant 0.47∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗
(7.16) (3.17) (2.79) (5.18) (2.32)
Lack-of-Transp*Pol.Confl 2.23∗∗∗ 2.10∗∗∗
(3.03) (2.79)
Political Conflict 0.35 0.27 -0.62 -0.48 -0.45
(0.91) (0.74) (-0.73) (-1.34) (-0.50)
Lack-of-Transp. -0.14 -0.14
(-0.86) (-0.79)
Lack-of-Sophist 0.29∗∗ -0.01 0.12 0.13
(2.45) (-0.04) (0.95) (-0.39)
Lack-of-Sophist*Pol.Confl 1.34 -0.04
(1.00) (-0.03)
N 66 66 66 66 66
R2 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.16
R̄2 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.09
Note: In this table we report the estimates of the regression in (1) when including lack of sophistication. The
dependent variables is the debt-to-GDP ratio for the 66 countries reported in Appendix B. t-statistics are reported
in parenthesis. (*) indicates significance at 10%; (**) indicates significance at 5%; (***) indicates significance at
1%. Standard errors are calculated using heteroskedasticity consistency estimator White (1980).
15These results are robust to including the additional regressors as in Table 3, including a full second order
specification in conflict, transparency, and sophistication.
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3 The Model
In this section we describe our economy of interest. There are two key features of the
model. First, we consider political conflict : as in Alesina and Tabellini (1990a), the economy
is populated by several groups of domestic agents that are represented by political parties.
The incentive of an incumbent to favour her group constitutes a political conflict. Second, in
our more general framework we introduce the concept of transparency. We assume that lack
of transparency induces inability of voters to judge and assess politicians. Therefore, a non-
transparent environment leads voters to base their support to an incumbent only when her
mandate was characterized by good economic performance, which in our model means higher
aggregate consumption level and utility. In this sense, we generalize Aguiar and Amador
(2011) by assuming that the probability of reelection is constant only in an economy charac-
terized by transparency, and that it is instead a function of previous aggregate consumption
levels in an economy where transparency is absent. We will show that these two features
jointly are able to replicate the empirical facts displayed in the previous section.
3.1 Preferences
Consider a neoclassical small open economy model with N + 1 equally sized groups of
domestic agents, each represented by a political party. Each period, one of the N+1 parties is
in office and the incumbent party remains in power with a given probability p (·). Conditional
on the incumbent losing the elections, each opponent party has equal probability 1−p(·)
N
of
being elected. In a non-transparent economy the probability of being reelected is a positive
function of aggregate consumption, whereas in a transparent economy, that probability is
constant and fixed, as in Aguiar and Amador (2011). We model political conflict by using the
partisan approach; the party in power decides borrowing and consumption allocation to the
different groups. We define the utility at time t of party i when that same party i is in power
as:








where θi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j s.t
∑N+1
j=1 θi,j = 1, is the weight that party i associates to the utility
of party j, and cit =
{




is the consumption allocation decided by party i. A
political party i cares about all the agents in the economy, but gives higher weight to agents
of its group i, meaning that θi,i ≥ θi,j. The instantaneous utility function u (·) is uniformly
continuous, twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in c, and satisfies the Inada
conditions. Similarly, the utility of an opposition party r when party i is in power, is defined
14
as:








Moreover, we assume no discrimination, i.e. each party weights equally the utility of other
types of agents and likes to be in power as the other parties do. In this way we have simplified
the problem by imposing symmetry, meaning that we are also going to restrict our attention




∀i, q such that 1
N
≤ θ < 1; hence, we can simply ignore the identity of the party in
power and at the opposition. Therefore, for the rest of the paper and for simplicity we denote
the utility of the incumbent i as U I(ct) ≡ U i,i(cit) and the utility of any opposition party, r, as
UO(ct) ≡ U i,r(cit). We exclude the case with θ = 1 in order to avoid corner solutions.16 Each
party is born at 0 and lives for T periods and discounts future utility at rate β.
3.2 International Financial Market and Output
The party in power (incumbent) has the ability to borrow or lend using an internationally
traded one-period risk-free non-contingent real bond. Borrowing and saving allow the govern-
ment to diverge the amount of aggregate consumption from the exogenous aggregate income
and to distribute it intertemporally. Similarly to a small-open economy setting, the evolution
of the debt position of the government is:
dt+1 − dt = rtdt + ct − yt, (3)
where dt+1 denotes the debt position at the beginning of period t + 1, chosen in period t, rt
denotes the country interest rate, and yt is an exogenous stochastic endowment. We assume
that each party cannot renege the debt contract in each period even if it was stipulated
by another party.17 We implicitly assume that the country is a small-open economy, which
we believe is a reasonable assumption given the set of countries considered in the empirical
section; the domestic interest rate is assumed to be the sum of a constant world interest rate
r∗ > 0 and a country-premium that is increasing in a detrended measure of aggregate debt,
16See Alesina and Tabellini (1990b) for a model where each party cares only about her personal consumption,
in such a case the borrowing implications are very different.
17See Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) and Prosperi (2016) for a discussion of the case when the government can
actually default.
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The variable d̃t denotes the aggregate level of debt, which is taken as given, ξ measures the
sensitivity of the interest rate to the debt position, and d̄ is a reference point. In equilibrium
d̃t = dt. Also, since the economy ends at T it must be that dT+1 = 0.
Remark. As discussed in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), standard small open economy
model, in which domestic residents have only access to a risk-free bond whose rate of return
is exogenously determined abroad, have the undesired property that the steady-state of the
model depends on initial conditions, more specifically upon the country’s initial net foreign
asset position. In other words, the equilibrium dynamics of the model follow a random walk
component and the distribution of debt is unbounded. In their seminal paper, Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2003) present several ways to close small open economy models, that is to slightly
modify the model specifications so that the model is stationary, i.e. does not depend on initial
condition; assuming a debt-elastic interest rate is one of this approach, which we adopt as it
is particularly convenient in our framework.
Output is assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process, i.e.:
log(yt) = ρy log(yt−1) + σyεt, (5)
where εt ∼ N(0, 1). In each period, the party in power (incumbent) decides the amount of
borrowing (lending) in the one-period bond (dt+1) and the allocations of consumption across






We consider a political environment where political power fluctuates between the N + 1
parties. Hence, we introduce political uncertainty in the model as an additional stochastic
process. Also, as in Acemoglu et al. (2011), the incumbent decides consumption allocation
between groups, but in our case the incumbent decides the amount of debt next period.18 As
in Acemoglu et al. (2011) the timing is as follows:
1. In each period t, we start with one party, i, in power.
2. Exogenous output yt realizes.
18Acemoglu et al. (2011) considers a closed economy with zero external borrowing.
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3. Party i chooses the level of aggregate consumption ct by choosing the quantity of debt
to carry to the next period, dt+1.
4. Given the level of aggregate consumption ct, party i chooses consumption allocations





5. Political uncertainty resolves. In an economy with transparency, the re-election proba-
bility parameter p, which determines the likelihood that an incumbent will be in power
also in the next period, is constant. Instead, with lack of transparency p follows a first
order Markov process. In this case, then, the probability of party j to retain office in
t + 1 depends on the level of aggregate consumption ct, and it is equal to p (ct), where
p (·) is a continuously differentiable and increasing function. If the incumbent j is not
reappointed (event with probability 1 − p (ct)), then the opposition parties have equal
probability of being in power. Hence, each opposition party will be in office in period
t+ 1 with probability 1−p(ct)
N
.
In Appendix C we describe in detail the Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium that arises
from this political environment.
Remark. In the rest of the paper we assume that the function p(c) is given and exogenous.
This approach allows us to clearly analyze the difference between the standard case in which
the reelection probability is constant to the one in which it depends on economic conditions.
Although certainly interesting, micro-funding that function is outside the scopes of this paper,
which, in contrast, focuses on the effects of that function, more than on its genesis.
In our framework the political setup induces two kinds of frictions:
1. The uncertainty from political elections together with the political conflict creating
disagreement about redistribution (as in Alesina and Tabellini (1990a));
2. The strategic behaviour of the incumbent to increase her probability of re-election by
increasing aggregate consumption via borrowing in a non-transparent economy. (see
Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988))
In the next sections we show that, with commonly used utility function, political uncer-
tainty [1] is not in general sufficient to create incentives for the incumbent to borrow. In
contrast, the strategic behaviour induced by lack of transparency [2] is able generate signifi-
cant amount of borrowing in the economy. This result implies that heterogeneity in the degree
of transparency and political conflict can produce large heterogeneity in borrowing decisions
that is observable in the data.
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3.4 The Benchmark: Transparent Economy with No Political Con-
flict
In order to study the role of political conflict and lack of transparency in consumption-
saving decisions, we use the following strategy. First, we shut down both channels to consider
a benchmark model without frictions. Then, we add first political conflicts alone, and we
compare the resulting borrowing incentives with the frictionless model. Finally, we include
also lack of transparency and we investigate how borrowing incentives are driven by the
interaction of these two frictions. To obtain useful analytical results, we first simplify the
model assuming that the economy lasts only two periods, t = 1, 2, and that output, y, and
the interest rate, r, are constant. Since the economy lasts only two periods, no borrowing is
allowed in the last period and it will be not optimal to save in the last period; hence d3 = 0.
We also assume that the discount factor is β−1 = 1 + r, so that there is no other borrowing
or lending incentive in the model other than the one resulting from political frictions.
As a benchmark for comparison we consider a model in which all frictions are eliminated,




∀q, i ∈ 1, ..., N + 1. In this case each party is indifferent to be in power or in
opposition as that would imply an identical consumption distribution; hence, we have that:






. As evident, in this case the political economy component of the
model is shut down, since any incumbent will equally distribute aggregate consumption across
agents, and, as a result, the political uncertainty does not play any role. Hence, the solution













s.t. dt+1 = (1 + r) dt + ct − y, for t = 1, 2 and d3 = 0,
with d1 given. The equilibrium of the frictionless model is given by:
u′
(









This condition implicitly characterizes the optimal debt in the frictionless economy, which
we denote as d∗2, as a function of the parameters d1, r, N, y. Importantly, note that in this
benchmark economy, the optimal level of debt d∗2 is such that consumption is equalized in the
two periods, i.e. c1 = c2.
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3.5 The Transparent Economy With Political Conflict
Let us now consider an economy with political conflicts, in which the incumbent i values
the utility of his party θi,i = θ >
1
N+1
. We still consider a transparent economy by assuming
that the probability of an incumbent to be reelected is a constant and equal to p.
Given a level of aggregate consumption, the incumbent’s utility is:






























since the opposition values θ his own instantaneous utility and (1−θ)
N
the utility of the incum-
bent and of the other N opposition parties. When there are political conflicts, for a given
level of aggregate consumption, c, the incumbent follows the optimal sharing rule that is given














Therefore, in case of political conflicts, the incumbent maximizes the intertemporal utility
with respect to {c1, c2,d2}, anticipating that the incumbent at period 2 will repay the public
debt, and will implement the optimal sharing rule.19 Hence, the problem for the incumbent
is then, given d1:
max
{c1,c2,d2}
U I(c1) + β
[
pU I(c2) + (1− p)UO(c2)
]













, for t = 1, 2.
The equilibrium condition of this problem is:
U I
′




(y − (1 + r)d2) + (1− p)UO
′
(y − (1 + r)d2)
]
, (9)
19Suppose, instead, that the incumbent does not apply the optimal sharing rule. Then, the incumbent at
period 2 could threaten the incumbent at period 1 by applying a more severe sharing to induce him not to
overborrow. Such an equilibrium would not be sub-game perfect, since in the stage game the incumbent will
















































where cO = c−c
I
N
is the amount of consumption of each opposition party. The equilibrium
condition (9) defines the equilibrium level of debt in case of political conflict, d̃∗2. Political
conflicts affect the intertemporal decision of the incumbent. When the incumbent is deciding
the optimal level of debt, she takes into account that the marginal cost of an extra unit of
debt in period-1 is the weighted average of the period-2 marginal utility of being incumbent
and opponent. Depending on the relative size of these two marginal utilities, political conflicts
can generate more saving or more borrowing with respect to the frictionless case. Proposition
(1) states the conditions for having more saving in a partisan economy with respect to the
frictionless economy.
Proposition 1. Political Conflicts and Savings. Consider the political economy model as
specified above; then the following statements are equivalent:

















See Appendix D.1 for the proof. This result is in contrast with Aguiar and Amador
(2011), which showed that political frictions generate incentive for borrowing. The reason
for their result is that they modeled political frictions using the opportunistic approach were
the incumbent has per-se larger marginal utility than the opponent. In our setting that
is not generally the case. In fact, Proposition 1 states that when the marginal utility of
the incumbent is lower then the marginal utility of the opponent then political conflicts
induce saving incentives. This is an intuitive result: if that condition is satisfied, a unit of
consumption is more valuable for the opposition than for the incumbent. Hence, a party is
willing to move resources from the incumbent state to the opposition state. Given that in
time t = 1 the decision maker is the incumbent and that there is some positive probability
that at time t = 2 that agent will be at the opposition, she is then willing to move resources
intertemporallty from t = 1 to t = 2. Notice that, as equations (10) and (11) show, the
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marginal utilities of the incumbent and opposition depend on the property of the utility
function not only through its first derivative u′, but also from its second derivative through
the sharing rule ∂c
i
∂c
. In fact, by using the implicit function theorem on equation (8), it is


















The shape of the utility function is then a crucial determinant on the role of political frictions.
We now define a general class of utility functions that have the useful property of implying a
proportional optimal sharing rule.
Definition 1. Proportional Sharing Rule. An utility function satisfies the Proportional
Sharing Rule (henceforth, PSR) property if the derivative ∂c
I
∂c
solution of the optimal sharing




The following corollary defines the condition for a utility function to satisfy the PSR.
Corollary 2. Consider an utility function u(c) and denote with g(·) the inverse of its marginal
utility. If for any two real positive numbers, a and x, g(·) satisfies the following property:
g(ax) = h(a)g(x) + l(a), (13)
where h(·) and l(·) are real-valued functions, then the utility function u(c) also satisfies the
PSR property.
See Appendix D.2 for the proof.
Condition (13) is quite general. In fact, it is satisfied for any utility function that belongs
to the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utilities, as proved in the following Corollary.
Corollary 3. HARA utility function and PSR. An utility function that belongs to the








with a > 0 and ac
σ
+ b > 0, satisfies the PSR property.
See Appendix D.3 for the proof. As a consequence, the most common utility functions
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(CRRA, logarithm, linear, quadratic, exponential) satisfy the PSR property. An interesting
consequence of proposition 1 arises when considering the CRRA utility function.
Corollary 4. CRRA and Savings. Consider the political economy model as specified above:


















(b) θ ≥ ψ ⇐⇒ σ ≥ 1.
(c) d̃∗2 ≤ d∗2 ⇐⇒ σ ≥ 1, with d̃∗2 = d∗2 ⇐⇒ σ = 1.
See Appendix D.4 for the proof. In the case of the CRRA utility function the saving con-
dition is always satisfied whenever σ ≥ 1. When σ → 1 (log utility case) the marginal utility
of the incumbent is equal to the marginal utility of the opposition party, and by Proposition 1
the equilibrium under political uncertainty is identical to the one in the frictionless economy,
for any value of p or θ. Hence, when considering logarithm instantaneous utility, political
uncertainty does not affect the consumption-saving decision.
As pointed out, the incentive for an incumbent to save relies on the willingness to bring
resources from its incumbent state to a possible opposition states. When the latter is less
likely, the saving incentive is reduced. The next corollary formally states this feature.
Corollary 5. Political uncertainty and Savings. Assuming that the utility function sat-
isfies the PSR property and it is such that U I
′









See Appendix D.5 for the proof.
The 2-period case that we have discussed in this section, had been already studied in
Alesina and Tabellini (1990b). The authors studied the case with 1
2
< θ < 1 and derived
the same condition for borrowing that is presented in proposition 1 in terms of ratios of the
concavity index defined by Debreu and Koopmans (1982). As it is stated in our Proposition 4
they argue that for the CRRA case, the borrowing condition is satisfied whenever 0 < σ < 1.
The problem is that this assumption makes it difficult to reconcile model predictions with
data.20 Since our final goal is to use a model that has realistic implications in the quantitative
analysis, in what follows we assume that σ ≥ 1. In this case, then, without any other friction,
political uncertainty and political conflict do not generate borrowing incentives.
20The responsiveness of consumption growth to a variation of the interest rate is completely determined by
1/σ as in standard intertemporal model with CRRA utility functions. This means that with σ < 1 consumption
growth is highly responsive to interest rate, an implication that the literature has found irreconcilable with
the data. Furthermore, in macro finance literature σ < 1 does not provide any good result in explaining how
agents face risky decisions.
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Finally, the last implication of Corollary 5 states that when political uncertainty disap-
pears, i.e. p = 1, the precautionary saving motives for an incumbent disappears, since it
will certainly stay in power forever. In this case, political conflict does not alter the optimal
decision of debt with respect to the benchmark frictionless economy.
3.6 The Non-Transparent Economy With Political Conflict
In the previous section we have pointed out that, under the commonly used parameteri-
zation of utility functions, political uncertainty alone does not generate borrowing incentives.
In this section we now introduce an important feature of our model, i.e. lack of transparency,
which we assume induces retrospective voting. We show that this feature is able to provide
borrowing incentives and, most importantly, it interacts with political conflicts in the similar
way as empirically estimated in Section 2. In what follows we modify the model presented
above by assuming that the probability of being reelected is an increasing function of the
aggregate consumption, p (c), and we assume that that the instantaneous utility function u(·)
satisfies the PSR property, i.e. ∂c
I
∂c
= ψ. The problem for the incumbent is, then, given d1:
max
{c1,c2,d1}
U I(c1) + β
[
p (c1)U
I(c2) + (1− p (c1))UO(c2)
]
(14)













∀t = 1, 2, (16)









I′(c2) + (1− p (c1))UO
′
(c2) . (17)
The solution of this equilibrium condition delivers the optimal level of debt in a non-transparent
economy, d̂∗2.
Comparing the equilibrium condition above with the equilibrium condition of the economy
with constant probability of re-election (equation (9)), lack of transparency adds an additional
term to the marginal benefit of borrowing, since increasing debt, and therefore aggregate
consumption, now increases the probability of being re-elected by p′(c). A higher probability
of being re-elected has a value equal to the difference in utility between the incumbent state
and the opposition state at period 2. Since this difference is always positive, and since
p′(c) > 0, this additional term increases the marginal utility of borrowing. Notice that the
first order condition in (17) could not be a sufficient condition for the equilibrium. In Appendix
D.6, Lemma 8, we display the sufficient condition on p(c) to guarantee that the equilibrium
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condition (17) characterizes a global maximum.
Under those conditions, we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Lack of Transparency and Borrowing. Assume conditions (26)-(27) are
satisfied. Define as d̂∗2 the solution of the two period model with lack of transparency that solves
equation (17); define as d̃∗2 the solution of the model with transparency that solves (9); then,
given a degree of political conflict θ > 1
N+1
, a non-transparent economy has higher borrowing
incentives than a transparent economy, i.e. d̃∗2 < d̂
∗
2;
See Appendix D.7 for the proof.
With additional conditions on the shape of the probability function, we can prove an
additional result.
Corollary 7. Assume conditions (26)-(27) are satisfied. Define as d∗2 the solution of the fric-
tionless benchmark model that solves equation (6). Also, consider a linear probability function,
i.e.:
p(c) = γ + α(c− c̄); (18)
then, if α is large enough, i.e. larger than a threshold level α̃, a non-transparent economy with




See Appendix D.8 for the proof.
Notice that the parameter α in equation (18) incorporates the degree of lack of trans-
parency: if α = 0, then the reelection probability is constant and equal to γ; instead, the
larger α, the strongest the reelection probability is linked to economic performances.21 Propo-
sition 6 and Corollary 7 are crucial results to link political friction to borrowing incentives. In
fact, when local maxima of problem (14)-(16) are ruled out, we can formally prove that lack
of transparency reduces saving incentives generated by political uncertainty and can create
borrowing incentive, if the sensitivity of the probability of being reelected is sensitive enough
to aggregate consumption.22
In the specific case of linear probability as defined in (18), we can easily check that: (i)
borrowing solutions always exist;(ii) we can always characterize a threshold level for α̃ s.t. if
α > α̃ we have positive level of debt; (iii) we can show that α̃ is independent of θ; (iv) when
21Although potentially this function could obtain values outside the [0, 1] interval, in the following exercise
we make sure that the realizations of the election probability lie in that interval.
22The results of Corollary 7 can be extended to a general probability function p(c), which is required to
have a large enough derivative at the optimal level consumption level.
24
utility is logarithmic then ∂d2/∂θ > 0 when α > α̃ = 0. In Appendix D.9 we investigate
analytically these properties considering a log utility function.
Remark. This reduced form for the reelection probability can be rationalized with a back-
ground model as in Alt and Lassen (2006), in which government debt cannot always be
observed instantaneously and from the government budget constraint, this implies that the
incumbent can raise debt in order to appear more able in providing public or consumption
goods. In this context one could interpret transparency as fiscal/budget transparency, which
affects voters’ ability to monitor government budgetary policies, or to observe and accurately
assess government debt before the election.
Remark. Our assumption that in less transparent economies election outcomes depends more
on macroeconomic performance is supported by the finding in the literature on political busi-
ness cycles (henceforth, PBC). Several works have addressed the empirical plausibility of the
existence of PBC; although at first evidence appeared to be weak, more recent studies have
pointed out the importance of controlling for the quality of institutions. For example, Bren-
der and Drazen (2008) analyze 350 election campaigns in 74 democracies and find that strong
macroeconomic performance is associated with a higher probability of reelection only in the
less developed countries and in younger democracies. Similarly, while Western European high-
income countries pooled studies are contradictory (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) for a
review), economic conditions are important determinants of the vote in lower-income countries
in Eastern Europe (see Pacek (1994)), Latin America (Remmer (1991)), and a broader set of
developing countries (Pacek and Radcliff (1995)). In addition, Alt and Lassen (2006) highlight
the difference between strength of democracy and transparency; they find that even among
advanced democracies, which therefore do not vary much in terms of strength of democracy,
significant opportunistic electoral cycles are conditional on the transparency of budget insti-
tutions and that in countries with less transparent institutions the political business cycle
appears, whereas that is not the case in higher-transparency countries.
3.7 Debt Incentives in a T -period model
Here we generalize the model by considering an economy with T large. This generalization
is important since one of our goal is to study the impact of political frictions on the level of
debt of the economy.
Remark. Once we move to a model with more than two periods, political uncertainty and
lack of transparency create computational challenges for solving the model. In fact, while
the problem could be rewritten in a recursive way by constructing a value function for the
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Table 5: Equilibrium Level of Debt in a T -period model
Lack of Transparency
No: α = 0 Medium: α = 1 High: α = 1.5
Conflict
No: θ=0.5 0 0 0
Medium: θ=0.7 -12.4 0.2 10.4
High: θ=0.9 -35.7 7.7 58.1
Note: In this table we report the average level of debt (in percentage) in a T -period economy, with T =
1000, when assuming CRRA utility function and linear probability, for different values of degree of lack of
transparency (α, x-axis) and degree of political friction, θ. Negative values denote savings.
incumbent and one for the opposition, as a function of the endogenous state (current debt) and
the exogenous states (an indicator for being or not the incumbent in the current period, and
the current level of output, when we assume it follows an AR(1) process as in equation (5)),
we were not able to prove the existence of an invariant policy, as in a non-transparent economy
the probability density for the evolution of the exogenous state depends on an endogenous
variable. Therefore, as an alternative, we follow Azzimonti et al. (2014) by allowing for an
arbitrarily large number of periods and solving the problem of the incumbent by backward
induction by assuming that each party plays Symmetric Markov Strategy.
In this section we assume that the election probability is linear, as defined in (18).23 To
show that the analytical results we have derived for a 2-period model hold even in a large-T
economy, we numerically solve the model and compute the average level of debt as a function
of the two main parameters of interest: the degree of political friction, θ, and the degree of
transparency, α. For illustrative purpose, in this exercise we shut down fluctuations in output,
so that political shocks are the only source of uncertainty. The rest of the parameters are
calibrated as discussed in Section 4.1.
Table 5 shows how the average equilibrium level of debt (measured in percentage of the
GDP) varies with the degree of political friction, θ, and the degree of lack of transparency,
α, when considering an economy that lasts for T = 1000 periods. Several results are worth
noting. First, not surprisingly, when political frictions are absent (i.e. θ = 0.5, since we
assume that there are only two parties, N = 1) the economy experiences no borrowing or
saving, since in this case there is no incentive for the incumbent to distort voting; in other
words the only uncertainty in the economy, which is political uncertainty, is irrelevant and, as
a consequence, there are no incentive to save or borrow. In contrast, when political frictions
arise (i.e. θ > 0.5) Table 5 highlights two important features of the model.
1. Consistently with the analytical results derived for the two period model, for a given
23In Appendix E we show the robustness of the results when assuming a non-linear utility function that is
always bounded in the interval [0, 1].
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level of θ, the economy on average accumulates savings when voters live in a transparent
economy, i.e. for low values of α, and the economy in average accumulate debt when
lack of transparency arises (i.e. for large values of α).
2. Consistently with the analytical results derived for the two period model, the effect
described above are more pronounced when political conflicts are stronger. In fact,
when θ increases, precautionary saving are even larger in a transparent economy, and
borrowing incentives are stronger in a non-transparent economy.
3. Qualitatively the relation between θ, α, and debt in the model resembles the one ob-
served in the data as described in Table 2.
4 Bringing the Model to the Data
In this section we investigate whether political conflicts and transparency are able to cap-
ture the different level of debts across countries as well as other important political economy
and macroeconomics features. Specifically, our strategy is as follows. First, we select observ-
able moments in the model that have a clear counterpart in the data. We will show that
these moments are affected by the degree of transparency, α, and political conflicts θ. Then,
for each country we use the prediction of our model to estimate these two parameters. We
then show that these two channels are able to replicate the observed heterogeneity in debt
levels and other macroeconomic fundamentals, and, importantly, that the estimated degree
of transparency and political conflict are indeed highly correlated with their proxies we have
used in the empirical section. We consider the same economies considered in the empirical
section and listed in Appendix B.
4.1 Strategy and Calibration
First, we calibrate some parameters that remain constant across the different economies.
Our goal is to investigate whether heterogeneity in transparency and political frictions alone
can explain the heterogeneity in debt levels and other macroeconomic variables. Hence,
we shut down possible heterogeneity in preference and on financial markets, but we allow
for heterogeneity in the output process. We fixed the word interest rate r∗ = 0.07, which
correspond at an annual rate of 7%, as reported in Uribe and Yue (2006). The subjective
discount rate is then pinned down such that β = (1+r∗)−1 = 0.9346. The coefficient of relative
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risk aversion, σ, is assumed to be 2. The debt elasticity of the interest rate, ξ is fixed at 0.1.24
The reference level of debt in the interest rate equation is assumed to be zero, which is d̄ = 0.25
We consider a linear probability function as in equation (18), i.e. p(c) = γ +α(c− c̄), and we
fixed the reference parameter c̄ to be equal to 1; this value is identical to the unconditional
mean of the exogenous endowment, in level, received by the agents in each period. Hence, if
consumption in a given period is greater than the unconditional mean, the electorate is more
likely to vote for the incumbent in a non-transparent economy (α > 0).
The remaining parameters are assumed to be country-specific. The parameters that define
the stochastic process for output are directly estimated from output data, by fitting an AR(1)
process on the deviation of the logarithm of GDP from its cubic trend, as in Garcia-Cicco et al.









where εit are iid, in the time dimension and cross-section dimension, disturbances. Hence,
for each country, we will estimate directly from detrended GDP data the persistence of the
income process, ρyi , and the standard deviation of the error term, σ
y
i . Given that the utility
function features risk aversion, different degrees of uncertainty in output realization imply
different strength of precautionary saving motive.
Finally, there are three parameters to be estimated that are related to the two main
channels introduced in our model; αi, which measure the degree of retrospective voting, which
we interpret as the degree of lack of transparency; γi, which is the probability of reelection
of an incumbent in a transparent economy; and θi, which measures the degree of political
conflict. We estimate these parameters by asking the model to replicate some features of the
data, using a GMM-approach.
Specifically, for each country i, we estimated Θi = {αi; γi; θi} as:
Θi = arg min
[




E(Yi)− E(Y (Θi; Θ̃i))
]
, (19)
where E(Yi) is a set of data moments, E(Y (Θi; Θ̃i)) is their model counterpart, which are
24The assumption of a positive debt elasticity of the interest rate is supported by the work of Kumar and
Baldacci (2010), who find that higher deficits and public debt lead to a significant increase in long-term
interest rates in a sample of 31 countries over the period 1980-2007, and of Grande et al. (2013), who find
that each percentage point increase in the ratio of public debt to GDP raises 10 year rates by about 3 basis
points focusing on 18 advanced economies over the period 1995-2011. If we were to set ξ = 0, the model would
generate too high level of debts and, as a consequence, the model fit would be not ideal. Even in that case,
however, the results of this paper would be qualitatively similar to the one described below.
25An alternative approach would be to assume that either preferences and/or financial markets are also
country specific, which would imply cross sectional variation on β, σ, ξ and d̄. As the goal of this quantitative
section is to investigate whether heterogeneity in transparency and political frictions alone can explain the
heterogeneity in debt levels and other macroeconomic variables, we have taken the stand to assume that
preferences and the supply equation of loans from international investor in equation (4) is not country specific.
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a function of the parameters to be estimated, Θi, and of the other calibrated parameters,




i , β, σ, d̄, r
∗, ξ, c̄, N
}
, and Wi is a weighting function. The
weighting function is computed through a conventional two-step GMM procedure. The model
moments are computed simulating the economy with T = 1000 periods, and eliminating the
first and last 100 observations in order to clear the results from initial and end conditions. We
include the following four moments, which are well defined in the model and that are directly
observed in the data (see Appendix A for a complete description of the data source). The first
moment is the average probability of reelection. This moment aims to make the model able to
match the country-specific political turnover. The second moment is the average level of debt
to output ratio, which aims to make the model to match the borrowing/saving outlook of a
country. The third moment is the standard deviation of consumption, which is partly due to
the variation in income that are taken into account by the calibrated parameters ρyi and σ
y
i and
to the country borrowing/saving dynamics. The fourth moment is the standard deviation of
the trade-balance-to-output ratio, which is driven mainly by the borrowing/saving dynamics.
To show that these four moments are able to identify the three parameters of interest, in
Figure 3 we simulate the model and display how these moments vary with θi (left panel) and
αi (right panel), for a given level of γi = 0.75, and assuming that ρ
y = 0.75 and σy = 0.02.
We can observe that variations in the two parameters imply a large heterogeneity in the level
of debt, as explained in the previous sections, in the reelection probability, and in the variance
of consumption and trade-balance, which are not equivalent even qualitatively especially for
low level of αi. Also, our model predicts that high reelection probability can coexist with high
levels of political conflict in very transparent economies; nevertheless, political instability
emerges in non transparent economies: large debt accumulation reduces consumption in the
long run and consequently reduces reelection probability. This result reconciles with the
findings in Easterly and Levine (1997), which shows that the univariate relationship between
political instability and ethnical conflict is rather ambiguous.
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Figure 3: Model Moments as function of Political Frictions and Transparency









































(a) Moments and θ









































(b) Moments and α
Note: In this Figure we plot the model-implied value of average debt (top-left panel), average reelection probability
(top-right panel), standard deviation of consumption (bottom-left panel), and standard deviation of trade-to-output
ratio (bottom-right panel), as a function of the degree of lack of transparency, θi(left panel) and political conflicts
αi (right panel), keeping fixed the other parameter. The other country-specific parameters are fixed as follows:
γi = 0.75, ρ
y
i = 0.75, and σ
y
i = 0.02. The moments are average of simulation with length T = 1000.
4.2 Fit
The first question to address is whether the three estimated parameters are able to provide
a reasonable match for the four target moments.
In Figure 4 we display the cross-sectional fit of the four moments. Specifically for each of
the four moments (average mean reelection probability, top-left panel; mean debt-to-gdp ratio,
top-right panel; standard deviation of consumption, bottom-left panel; standard deviation of
trade-balance to output ratio, bottom-right panel), we plot the data value for each country
in the y-axis and its model counterpart computed at the estimated parameters value. If the
model was able to perfectly match the data the scatter plots would lie in the 45 degree line
(displayed with a continuous blue line). The fit is extremely good for the two first moments
(slope of the regression line equal to 0.92 and 0.98, and R2 equal to 0.97 and 0.98, respectively),
while the fit of the two second moments is slightly less impressive, but still satisfactory (slope
of the regression line equal to 0.55 and 0.51, and R2 equal to 0.69 and 0.72, respectively). Since
the fit is overall good, we claim that variations in three parameters αi, γi, and θi, together
with the variations in the income process, are able to capture the cross-section heterogeneity
in the four targeted models. Notice, that our estimation procedure attempts to match four
moments with only three parameters.26
26One might wonder whether the four moments are collinear. This is not the case, as the cross correlation
30
Figure 4: Fit






















































































































































































































































































Note: This figure plots the model-implied moments of interest, i.e. average debt (top-left panel), average reelection
probability (top-right panel), standard deviation of consumption (bottom-left panel), and standard deviation of
trade-to-output ratio (bottom-right panel), at the estimated parameter values the y-axis, with standard error bands,
and their data counterpart in the x-axis, for each country in our sample. The red solid line is the 45 degree line.
The dashed blue line is the regression line.
4.3 Hypothesis testing on the mechanism
Our empirical strategy estimates the degree of transparency, α̂i, and of political conflicts, θ̂i
for a country i, only by using data on macroeconomic moments. We now investigate whether
the main mechanism in our model, which is the interaction between lack of transparency
and political conflict as a driver of debt incentives, is supported by the data. The GMM
approach in equation (19) allows us to test the following joint hypothesis, for each country i,
by computing the asymptotic distribution of the estimators:
H0 : θi =
1
2
, αi = 0 (20)
H1 : θi >
1
2
, αi > 0
For all the country, the resulting F -statistic is very high and the test strongly rejects the null
hypothesis.27 Next, we investigate whether, for each country, θi =
1
2
and αi = 0, indepen-
among the four moments is:
Σ =

1 0.15 0.22 0.23
0.15 1 0.14 0.02
0.22 0.14 1 0.81
0.23 0.02 0.81 1
 .
27Results of the F -statistic are available upon request from the authors.
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dently. These tests clarify whether the political conflict channel or the transparency channels
are detected. In Table 6 we report the estimated parameters θ̂i, α̂i, and, for completeness,
also γ̂i, and the associated standard error, in brackets.
28 For 44 out of 66 countries, we reject
the null hypothesis of no political frictions, while for 42 countries we reject the null hypothesis
of no lack of transparency. We conclude that: (i) no country exhibit absence of both frictions;
and (ii) at least in two third of our sample a country displays either political conflict or lack
of transparency.
4.4 Do the estimates capture transparency and political conflict?
We now investigate whether the estimated parameters θ̂i and α̂i do actually relate to the
observed proxies of political conflict and lack of transparency, which we have defined and used
in Section 2 for the cross-country regressions.
Recall that the estimation procedure in equation (19) that we have implemented does not
use any information regarding the degree of transparency and political conflict of a country,
but it only employs the relationship between re-election probabilities, levels of debt, and con-
sumption and trade balance variances. Therefore, if we find a positive relationship between
the two estimates θ̂i and α̂i and the observed proxies of political conflict and lack of trans-
parency, we can conclude that our simple model is able to attribute cross-country variations
of debt to the interaction between transparency and political conflict.
A first natural step to explore whether the estimated parameters θ̂i and α̂i positive correlate
with the observed proxies of political conflict and lack of transparency, is to draw a scatter
plot of the model estimates and their proxies, for any given country. In Figure 5a and 5b
we plot, on the x-axis, the empirical counterpart of θ and α defined in Section 2, and on the
y-axis we plot the estimated θ̂i and α̂i. The correlations between model estimates and proxies
are positive and equal to 0.26 and 0.27 for political conflicts and transparency, respectively.
Possible explanation for imperfect fit Although the positive relationship between data
and estimates is comforting, nevertheless it is not possible to ignore the evidence that there are
disturbances around the linear relationship. The imperfect fitting may arise for two different
reasons:
1. Specification Error: The model considered in this paper is a rather stylized model
of consumption smoothing, in which output is exogenous (i.e. no production), financial
markets are competitive, debt contracts are fully enforceable, there are only two possible
28For the intercept of p(c) we tested the null hypothesis of γ = 1.
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Table 6: Estimated parameters
θ̂ α̂ γ̂ θ̂ α̂ γ̂
ARG 0.89** 1.12*** 0.89 KEN 0.92*** 0.81*** 1.07
(0.17) (0.38) (0.09) (0.06) (0.12) (0.05)
AUS 0.59*** 2.42*** 0.88** KOR 0.58* 2.32*** 0.8***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.07)
AUT 0.56*** 1.98*** 0.85*** LVA 0.85*** 1.12*** 0.64***
(0.02) (0.13) (0.02) (0.03) (0.14) (0.11)
BGD 0.62*** 1.99*** 0.76*** MYS 0.89*** 3.21*** 1.68***
(0.01) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.13) (0.14)
BEL 0.76 1.79 0.92 MEX 0.6*** 2.01*** 0.86***
(0.26) (3.21) (0.25) (0.03) (0.25) (0.04)
BOL 0.76 1.84 0.76** MAR 0.75*** 2.46*** 1.23***
(0.24) (2.32) (0.1) (0.02) (0.12) (0.05)
BRA 0.69 1.55*** 0.86*** NAM 0.8*** 3.02*** 1.3***
(0.12) (0.5) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
BGR 0.65 1.74 0.86 NPL 0.71*** 1.68*** 0.72***
(0.24) (3.77) (0.1) (0.04) (0.38) (0.07)
BDI 0.84*** 2.7*** 1.3*** NLD 0.63*** 1.78* 0.9
(0.04) (0.12) (0.08) (0.02) (1.03) (0.07)
CAN 0.64 1.75 0.85*** NZL 0.56 1.92*** 0.82***
(0.11) (2.18) (0.05) (0.04) (0.15) (0.03)
CHL 0.99*** 0.66*** 1.01 NOR 0.71*** 2.69*** 0.96
(0.07) (0.14) (0.06) (0.04) (0.12) (0.1)
COL 0.5 1.25*** 0.73*** PAK 0.71 1.75 0.86***
(0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.22) (2.51) (0.02)
CRI 0.74 1.8 0.85 PAN 0.76 1.59** 0.89***
(0.36) (3.6) (0.14) (0.17) (0.78) (0.03)
CZE 0.57** 2.4*** 0.79*** PNG 0.84*** 3.07*** 1.26
(0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.17) (0.17)
DNK 0.61*** 1.95*** 0.87** PRY 0.66*** 2.42*** 0.95
(0.02) (0.22) (0.06) (0.06) (0.25) (0.16)
DOM 0.56 1.37*** 0.79*** PER 0.81** 1.15*** 0.91
(0.04) (0.16) (0.04) (0.15) (0.3) (0.08)
ECU 0.68 1.84 0.74 PHL 0.61 1.67 0.89***
(0.58) (8.12) (0.25) (0.33) (4.69) (0.04)
EGY 0.77*** 2.51*** 1.28*** POL 0.57*** 1.78*** 0.84***
(0.02) (0.13) (0.07) (0.01) (0.39) (0.04)
ETH 0.84 1.47 1.11 PRT 0.52 1.87*** 0.64***
(0.24) (1.21) (0.07) (0.04) (0.19) (0.05)
FIN 0.57*** 2.11*** 0.75*** ROU 0.76*** 1.22*** 0.74***
(0.03) (0.16) (0.06) (0.08) (0.18) (0.1)
FRA 0.54 1.88*** 0.63*** RUS 0.62*** 2.37*** 0.88***
(0.03) (0.16) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03)
GHA 0.76*** 1.33*** 0.94 ZAF 0.72*** 2.61*** 1.02
(0.09) (0.26) (0.05) (0.03) (0.12) (0.09)
GRC 0.72 1.77 0.89 ESP 0.57* 1.28*** 0.83***
(3.42) (37.78) (1.58) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03)
GTM 0.61*** 2.26*** 0.68*** SWZ 0.91*** 3.46*** 1.83***
(0.03) (0.13) (0.05) (0.09) (0.31) (0.32)
HND 0.78*** 2.26*** 1.02 SWE 0.63*** 1.85*** 0.76***
(0.02) (0.34) (0.1) (0.03) (0.53) (0.07)
HUN 0.82 1.74 0.94 THA 0.62* 1.44*** 0.64***
(3.65) (27.12) (0.85) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
IND 0.63*** 2.32*** 0.83** TUN 0.59 1.58 0.95**
(0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.1) (1.22) (0.02)
IDN 0.63 1.37*** 0.88*** TUR 0.64*** 2.35*** 0.75***
(0.09) (0.12) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08)
IRL 0.69 1.81 0.81 GBR 0.64*** 1.28*** 0.85**
(0.48) (6.01) (0.21) (0.04) (0.12) (0.06)
ITA 0.81** 1.98 0.73 USA 0.62*** 1.78** 0.84***
(0.13) (1.61) (0.24) (0.03) (0.82) (0.04)
CIV 0.77 1.77 1.04 URY 0.86* 1.09** 0.92
(0.22) (2.32) (0.17) (0.21) (0.44) (0.1)
JPN 0.77* 1.88 0.73* VEN 0.84*** 3.15*** 1.46***
(0.15) (1.81) (0.15) (0.02) (0.09) (0.1)
JOR 0.85*** 2.95*** 1.53*** ZMB 1*** 1.07*** 1.16**
(0.03) (0.2) (0.14) (0.11) (0.39) (0.07)
Note: In this table we report estimated parameter values of θ̂i, α̂i, and γ̂i. Standard errors are reported in
brackets. We denote with *** significance at 1%, with ** significance at 5%, and with * significance at 10%.
Specifically, we tested the following null hypothesis θ = 0.5, α = 0, γ = 1.
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Figure 5: Scatterplot of estimated parameters and proxies of transparency and conflict
















































































(a) Estimated α vs Trasparency

















































































(b) Estimated θ vs Conflict
Note: In this Figure we plot the relationship between our estimates of political frictions (y-axis) and their data
proxies (x-axis). In the left panel we plot the estimated degree of transparency (α̂i) and the proxy Transpi as
defined in section 2. In the right panel we plot the estimated degree of political conflict (θ̂) and the proxy Confli
as defined in section 2. The solid lines are regression lines.
shocks (to domestic output and to reelection probability) so other relevant internal
or external sources of risk are ignored. Whenever these missing features are actually
relevant in determining the empirical moments that we have employed in our estimation
strategy (i.e. re-election probability, level of debt, and consumption and trade balance
variances), then the estimated parameters {Θ̂i} may differ from their real value. For
example, suppose that debt to GDP is larger in country i than in country j because
of different demographic structures that result in different costs of the pension system.
Since this element is not present in our model, country i would result as more politically
frictioned compared to country j.
2. Measurement Error: Another potential source of error comes from the unobserv-
ability of the real structural parameters. The proxies for lack of transparency and
political conflicts proposed in Section 2 are only imperfect measures of the real institu-
tional frictions. For example, to proxy political conflict we averaged different measures
of fractionalization following the literature. As explained in Section 2, the existence
of fractionalization might not necessarily imply that a conflict between parties exists.
Observing more accurate measures of conflict would reduce the measurement error aris-
ing from comparing the structural parameter θ implied and its data proxies. Similarly,
we do not observe the degree of lack of transparency, which relates to the degree of
retrospective voting in our model, in each country but only possible determinants of the
existence of this phenomenon.
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Given the argument above, the imperfect fitting resulting in the scatters of Figure 5a
and 5b may result from estimating a too stylized model and from comparing the estimates to
imprecise proxies. Removing these sources of the errors is not an easy task and it would ideally
require developing a richer model or observing different data. Nevertheless, in what follows
we try to correct for these possible errors and to investigate whether, when addressing them,
the relationship between the data and the estimates becomes stronger or weaker. To address
this point we proceed by adding potential omitted factors in the regression of Θ̂, i.e. the
structurally estimated parameters of interest, on their proxies from the data, and then testing
whether Specification errors and Measurement errors alter the positive relationship between
estimated parameters and data proxies. To address the Specification error, we include the
same control variables that have used to test the cross section of debt in equation (1). To
address the Measurement error we included alternative proxies of conflict and transparency
that could help in reaching a more accurate measure of the proxies. Hence, we run the
following regressions:




i + ηi; (21)




i + νi; (22)
where Conflicti and Transpi are the proxies defined in Section 2, X
s
i are the control variables
used in the regression (1) and that aim to capture the Specification error, Zm,α and Zm,θ are
control variables that aim to capture the Measurement errors for α and θ, respectively, and
ηi and νi are iid disturbances. Explanatory variables are included in the model as averages
in the period available.
In Table 7 we present the results for the two regressions. Regarding transparency, left
panel, the first column displays the results for the univariate regression corresponding to
the solid regression line in Figure 5a: as expected the coefficient is positive and strongly
significant, although the fit is not excellent, since the R2 is below 0.1. In column 2 (Spec.) we
address the Specification error by including a selection of most significant control variables
among the one used in regression (1). Recall that these control variables aim to capture
possible determinants of debt levels that are not included in our model. Accounting for the
Specification error improves quite substantially the fit, since the R2 increases to 0.35, but,
importantly, it does not alter the significant and strong positive relationship between the
estimated degree of lack of transparency, and its data counterpart. In column 3 (Meas.)
we analyze the role of an alternative interpretation of lack of transparency, that is lack of
sophistication, to reduce potential measurement error. We have included the two different
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variables that capture lack of sophistication, as described in section 2: Lack of Education
and Lack of Social Globalization. Only the second variable is significant and the fit increases
only marginally, but the significance disappear when we include all the controls as displayed
in column 4 (Complete). Notice, that even when addressing the Measurement error and in
the complete regression, the statistically significant positive relationship between α̂, and the
proxy of lack of transparency still holds.
The right panel displays the results for the regression for political friction in equation
(22). As before, in the first column (Univariate) we present univariate regression of θ̂ on
Conflict. As expected the slope is positive and significant. In the second column (Spec.)
we present multivariate regression with the same controls included in Table 7. In contrast
with the α case, the majority of controls that account for the the Specification error are
not significant; furthermore, the relation between the estimate θ̂ and the proxy of political
conflict becomes not significant, albeit still positive. In column 3 (Meas.) we add only
controls for the measurement error, i.e. a measure of dictatorship (No Party allowed) aimed
to capture a degree of political friction that is not embodied in fractionalization, the Gini
index,29 as a measure of economic inequality, and political killings, which is a measure of
realized conflict. We find that measurement controls are strongly significant and improve
substantially the fit. Importantly, the significant positive relationship between estimated
parameters and our benchmark proxies holds. The same conclusion applies when estimating
the complete regression.
To summarize, we found that the estimated institutional parameters in our model, i.e.
political conflict and lack of transparency, are positively correlated with the proxies that have
been found to explain the cross section of debt-to-gdp across countries. The positive relation-
ship holds when controlling for possible specification errors of the model and measurement
errors in the proxy. Our preliminary analysis supports the idea that a less stylized model
would probably help in improving the link, but we nevertheless found support that indeed
lack of transparency and political conflict can be an important determinant of observed het-
erogeneity of debt levels across countries.
29Remember that, in our model, larger θ implies larger distribution of consumption to the incumbent’s
party, which results in greater inequality.
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Table 7: Estimated parameters, Transparency and Political Conflict
Dependent var: α̂ Dependent var: θ̂
Univariate Spec. Meas. Complete Univariate Spec. Meas. Complete
Constant 1.74∗∗ -1.21 2.01∗∗∗ -2.05 0.49∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.10
(16.39) (-1.18) (17.13) (-1.41) (5.37) (2.66) (2.22) (0.26)
Lack-of-Transp. 0.58∗∗ 0.79∗∗ 1.11∗∗ 0.68∗
(2.14) (2.09) (2.59) (1.70)
Political Conflict 0.30∗∗ 0.20 0.30∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(2.29) (1.50) (2.05) (2.71)
Energy 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗∗
(4.46) (4.45) (0.79) (2.04)
Business 0.39∗∗ 0.38∗ 0.04 0.05
(2.22) (1.80) (1.08) (1.40)
GDP per capita 0.23∗∗ 0.31∗∗ -0.02 -0.01
(2.34) (2.11) (-1.09) (-0.20)
Majoritarian 0.32∗ 0.37∗∗ -0.01 -0.00
(1.89) (2.13) (-0.23) (-0.11)
Openness 0.60∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.02
(3.15) (2.76) (1.96) (0.41)
Lack of Social Glob -0.98∗∗ 0.10 0.17
(-2.47) (0.21) (1.59)
Lack of Educ 0.08 0.22 -0.09
(0.25) (0.45) (-1.60)
No Parties Allow. 0.15 0.23∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.43) (2.22) (3.02)
Gini index 0.12 0.37∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.09) (3.47) (3.43)
Political killings -0.07 0.04∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(-0.47) (1.79) (3.43)
R2 0.07 0.35 0.17 0.37 0.06 0.22 0.31 0.43
R̄2 0.06 0.28 0.13 0.24 0.05 0.15 0.26 0.31
N 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
Note: This table presents the results of regression (21) (left panel) and for (22) (right panel). The univariate regression
displays the link between estimated degree of lack-of transparency, α̂i and its proxy observed in the data, Transpi (left
panel) and θ̂i and its proxy observed in the data, Confli (right panel). The regression labeled Spec includes control variables
Xsi that capture the Specification error. The regression labeled Meas. includes control variables Z
m,θ
i that capture the
Measurement error. The final regression is the complete regression. For each country, all variables are calculated as sample
average.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we study the relationship between cross-country sovereign debt, lack of
transparency and political conflicts. Our first set of results is empirical. Whereas these two
variables, per-se, are not significant determinants of observed debt levels across countries, their
interaction is a key factor to explain debt-levels heterogeneity. In fact, whereas the simple
regression of debt levels on political conflict and lack of transparency yields insignificant
coefficients, their interaction term is positive and significant. This implies that if political
conflict increases in a transparent economy (low lack of transparency values), its effect on
debt is negative (which means it incentivizes saving); on the contrary, in a non-transparent
economy (high lack of transparency values) large political conflicts induce borrowing (more
debt).
Then, we propose a model that rationalizes these findings. We incorporate political con-
flicts and transparency into a conventional open-economy real business cycle model. Regard-
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ing political conflict, similarly to Alesina and Tabellini (1990b), parties have preferences over
distribution across different groups and decide the allocation of consumption according to
these preferences. Regarding lack of transparency, we assume that in more non-transparent
economies, the probability of an incumbent to be re-elected is more strongly a function of
current economic conditions. This model can generate the empirical finding that in a trans-
parent economy, political conflict generates savings, since an incumbent has a precautionary
saving motive driven by political uncertainty, while with lack of transparency it incentivizes
borrowing, since a higher amount of resources in the economy increases re-election probability.
We then use the theoretical prediction of our model about macroeconomic aggregates to
estimate the two frictions. Using a GMM approach, our strategy yields a cross section set
of estimates for the two parameters of interest, the degree of political conflict and lack of
transparency. Notice that we use only observed macroeconomic moments to estimate these
frictions, without using any information about the actual degree of these frictions. Hence, the
second natural step is to investigate how our estimates correlate, in the cross-section, with
observed proxies of political conflict and lack of transparency. Our finding can be summarized
as follows. First, the model strongly supports the existence of these frictions and the estimated
frictions positively and significantly relate to their data counterparts. Third, once one takes
into account possible sources of bias, the positive relationship becomes even stronger. Hence,
we are confident that the mechanism proposed in our model can rationalize the empirical
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A Appendix: Data Source
Institutional variables come from different sources that are collected in the Quality of
Government dataset Teorell et al. (2011).
A.1 Debt-to-GDP
Debt to GDP data has been collected from Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and Jaimovich and Panizza (2010).
From Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) we took debt to GDP measured as the share of total gross general public
debt (domestic and external) over gross domestic product, last year available 2009.30 Country coverage has
been extended by using the dataset of Jaimovich and Panizza (2010) at the cost of fewer observation in the
time-dimension (until 2005), where the debt data refers to gross central (as opposite to general) government
debt and for this reason it is not fully comparable with the data in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). Gross domestic
product is extracted from the World Bank dataset, is calculated at constant local currency prices. In fact,
from this dataset we can also include the following countries: Bangladesh, Burundi, Czech Republic, Ethiopia,
Jordan, Latvia, Namibia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Swaziland.
A.2 Transparency proxies
• Functioning of Government (FOG): This variable examines to what extent the freely elected head of
government and a national legislative representative determine the policies of the government; if the
government is free from pervasive corruption; and if the government is accountable to the electorate
between elections and operates with openness and transparency. Countries are graded from the worst
to the best.
• Freedom of Expression and Belief (FEB): This variable measures the freedom and independence of
the media and other cultural expressions; the freedom of religious groups to practice their faith and
express themselves; the academic freedom and freedom from extensive political indoctrination in the
educational system; and the ability of the people to engage in private (political) discussions without
fear of harassment or arrest by the authorities. Countries are graded from the worst to the best.
The source for the two variables is Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org. Other proxies from this
source have been used to define an alternative transparency index that has been used in regression (12) of
Table 3. The available sample for these variables is 2005-2008, see Table A.7.
A.3 Political conflict proxies
• Ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization: Fractionalization expresses the probability that two
randomly selected individuals from the population will not belong to the same ethnic/linguistic/religious
group. Time coverage differs across countries. Source Alesina et al. (2003).
30We made few exceptions due to data availability. In Tunisia we choose total non-financial public sector
debt over GDP, while for UK we choose net central public debt over GDP.
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A.4 Control Variables used in Section 2
• Credit : domestic credit provided by the banking sector. Source World Development Indicators (WDI)
• GPDpc: GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2005 international $) . Source WDI
• GDP growth: annual growth rate of GDP per capita. Source WDI
• Openness: sum of export and imports over GDP. Source Penn world tables
• Majoritarian: fraction of years in which the country had majoritarian system. Source Norris (2009)
• Energy : per-capita energy production (kt of oil equivalent). Source WDI
• Business: variable easiness of doing business. Source WDI
• Pop>65 : share of the population over 65 years old. Source WDI
Lack of sophistication is the average of two different proxies:
• Lack of Education: (inverse of) number of students at universities or other higher education institutions
per 100000 inhabitants. Source: Index of Power resources Vanhanen (2004)
• Lack of Social Globalization: it is measured by three categories of indicators; (i) personal contacts, such
as telephone traffic and tourism; (ii) information flows, e.g. number of Internet users; and (iii) cultural
proximity, e.g. trade in books and number of Ikea warehouses per capita. Source: KOF Globalisation
Index, Dreher (2006)
A.5 Data used for GMM estimation
Output is GDP per capita in costant local currency. Consumption is calculated by multiplying GDP per
capita and final consumption expenditure in percentage of GDP. Trade balance is calculated as the difference
between output and consumption. Consumption and output are detrended using cubic polynomial. The
source of macroeconomic data is WDI. Mean re-election probability is calculated as the average number of
years in office of the chief executive, from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. (2001) and Keefer
(2009)).
A.6 Data for the Measurement Error regression
• No Parties Allowed : For a single year the index takes value 1 if parties are not allowed. Source:
Institutions and Elections Project Regan and Clark (2010).
• Gini Index : Source WDI
• Political Killings and Imprisonment : These proxies measure the frequency of political killings and
imprisonment. Source Human Rights Dataset Cingranelli and Richards (2010)
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A.7 Sample Available for the Analysis
Table 8: Sample available for each country and each variable
country Debt/GDP Lack Transp. Pol. Conflict Credit Energy Business GDP p.c. (PPP) GDP growth Majoritarian
ARG 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
AUS 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
AUT 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
BDI 75-05 05-08 75-05 75-05 75-05 08-09 80-05 75-05 75-04
BEL 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
BGD 90-05 05-08 90-05 90-05 90-05 08-09 90-05 90-05 90-04
BGR 81-09 05-08 81-09 91-09 81-09 08-09 81-09 81-09 81-04
BOL 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
BRA 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
CAN 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-08 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
CHL 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
CIV 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
COL 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
CRI 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
CZE 93-05 05-08 93-05 93-05 93-05 08-09 93-05 93-05 93-04
DNK 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
DOM 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
ECU 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
EGY 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
ESP 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
ETH 93-05 05-08 93-05 93-05 93-05 08-09 93-05 93-05 93-04
FIN 76-09 05-08 76-09 76-09 76-09 08-09 80-09 76-09 76-04
FRA 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
GBR 75-07 05-08 75-07 75-07 75-07 08-09 80-07 75-07 75-04
GHA 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
GRC 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
GTM 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
HND 80-09 05-08 80-09 80-09 80-09 08-09 80-09 80-09 80-04
HUN 91-09 05-08 91-09 91-09 91-09 08-09 91-09 91-09 91-04
IDN 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
IND 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
IRL 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
ITA 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
JOR 76-05 05-08 76-05 76-05 76-05 08-09 80-05 76-05 76-04
JPN 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
KEN 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
KOR 76-09 05-08 76-09 76-09 76-09 08-09 80-09 76-09 76-04
LVA 94-05 05-08 94-05 94-05 94-05 08-09 94-05 94-05 94-04
MAR 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
MEX 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
MYS 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
NAM 91-05 05-08 91-05 91-05 91-05 08-09 91-05 91-05 91-04
NLD 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
NOR 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-06 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
NPL 85-05 05-08 85-05 85-05 85-05 08-09 85-05 85-05 85-04
NZL 77-09 05-08 77-09 77-09 77-09 08-09 80-09 78-09 77-04
PAK 75-05 05-08 75-05 75-05 75-05 08-09 80-05 75-05 75-04
PAN 80-09 05-08 80-09 80-09 80-09 08-09 80-09 80-09 80-04
PER 80-09 05-08 80-09 80-09 80-09 08-09 80-09 80-09 80-04
PHL 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
PNG 75-05 05-08 75-05 75-05 75-05 08-09 80-05 75-05 75-04
POL 90-09 05-08 90-09 90-09 90-09 08-09 90-09 91-09 90-04
PRT 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
PRY 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
ROU 92-09 05-08 92-09 92-09 92-09 08-09 92-09 92-09 92-04
RUS 92-09 05-08 92-09 93-09 92-09 08-09 92-09 92-09 92-04
SWE 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
SWZ 78-05 05-08 78-05 78-05 78-05 08-09 80-05 78-05 78-04
THA 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
TUN 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
TUR 77-09 05-08 77-09 77-09 77-09 08-09 80-09 77-09 77-04
URY 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
USA 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
VEN 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
ZAF 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 75-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
ZMB 75-09 05-08 75-09 75-09 80-09 08-09 80-09 75-09 75-04
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country Openness Pop>65 Lack Educ. Lack Soc.Glob. Gini No Parties Allow. Pol. Killings Re-election GDP p.c.(LC)
ARG 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 86-06 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
AUS 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 94-94 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
AUT 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 00-00 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
BDI 75-05 75-05 68-98 70-06 92-06 72-05 81-08 75-05 75-05
BEL 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 00-00 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
BGD 90-05 90-05 78-98 70-06 86-05 72-05 81-08 90-05 90-05
BGR 81-07 81-09 68-98 70-06 89-03 72-05 81-08 81-09 81-09
BOL 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 91-07 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
BRA 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 81-07 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
CAN 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 00-00 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
CHL 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 87-06 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
CIV 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 85-02 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
COL 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 88-06 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
CRI 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 81-07 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
CZE 93-05 93-05 98-98 93-06 88-96 93-05 93-08 93-05 93-05
DNK 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 97-97 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
DOM 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 86-07 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
ECU 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 87-07 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
EGY 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 91-05 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
ESP 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 00-00 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
ETH 93-05 93-05 98-98 70-06 82-05 93-05 93-08 93-05 93-05
FIN 76-07 76-09 68-98 70-06 00-00 72-05 81-08 76-09 76-09
FRA 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 95-95 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
GBR 75-07 75-07 68-98 70-06 99-99 72-05 81-08 75-07 75-07
GHA 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 88-06 72-05 82-08 75-09 75-09
GRC 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 00-00 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
GTM 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 87-06 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
HND 80-07 80-09 68-98 70-06 86-06 72-05 81-08 80-09 80-09
HUN 91-07 91-09 68-98 70-06 87-04 72-05 81-08 91-09 91-09
IDN 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 05-07 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
IND 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 05-05 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
IRL 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 00-00 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
ITA 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 00-00 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
JOR 76-05 76-05 68-98 70-06 87-06 72-05 81-08 76-05 76-05
JPN 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 93-93 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
KEN 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 92-05 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
KOR 76-07 76-09 68-98 70-06 98-98 72-05 81-08 76-09 76-09
LVA 94-05 94-05 98-98 91-06 88-07 92-05 92-08 94-05 94-05
MAR 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 85-07 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
MEX 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 84-08 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
MYS 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 84-04 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
NAM 91-05 91-05 98-98 70-06 93-93 91-05 81-08 91-05 91-05
NLD 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 99-99 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
NOR 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 00-00 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
NPL 85-05 85-05 68-98 70-06 96-04 72-05 81-08 85-05 85-05
NZL 77-07 77-09 68-98 70-06 97-97 72-05 81-08 77-09 77-09
PAK 75-05 75-05 78-98 70-06 87-05 72-05 81-08 75-05 75-05
PAN 80-07 80-09 68-98 70-06 79-06 72-05 81-08 80-09 80-09
PER 80-07 80-09 68-98 70-06 86-07 72-05 81-08 80-09 80-09
PHL 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 85-06 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
PNG 75-05 75-05 88-98 70-06 96-96 76-05 81-08 75-05 75-05
POL 90-07 90-09 68-98 70-06 85-05 72-05 81-08 90-09 90-09
PRT 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 97-97 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
PRY 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 90-07 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
ROU 92-07 92-09 68-98 70-06 89-07 72-05 81-08 92-09 92-09
RUS 92-07 92-09 98-98 90-06 88-07 92-05 92-08 92-09 92-09
SWE 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 00-00 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
SWZ 78-05 78-05 88-98 70-06 95-01 72-05 81-08 78-05 78-05
THA 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 81-04 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
TUN 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 85-00 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
TUR 77-07 77-09 68-98 70-06 87-06 72-05 81-08 77-09 77-09
URY 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 89-07 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
USA 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 00-00 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
VEN 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 81-06 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
ZAF 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 93-00 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
ZMB 75-07 75-09 68-98 70-06 91-04 72-05 81-08 75-09 75-09
Note: GDP per capita LC (local currency) is used for GMM estimation together with Trade balance and Consumption,
whose sample size coincides with GDP.
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B Appendix: List of Countries
We collect public data from different sources of 66 economies listed in Table 9. Selected countries are
strongly heterogenous in terms of economic development: we have included OECD economies, emerging
economies and developing economies. The choice of which country to include in the analysis that follows has
been driven mainly by the existence of data on government debt over GDP.
Table 9: List of Countries
Argentina Greece Pakistan
Australia Guatemala Panama






Burundi Ivory Coast Romania
Canada Japan Russia
Chile Jordan South Africa
Colombia Kenya Spain
Costa Rica Korea Swaziland
Czech Republic Latvia Sweden
Denmark Malaysia Thailand
Dominican Republic Mexico Tunisia
Ecuador Morocco Turkey
Egypt Namibia United Kingdom
Ethiopia Nepal United States
Finland Netherland Uruguay
France New Zealand Venezuela
Ghana Norway Zambia
C Appendix: Equilibrium
We describe the game as follows. We define the state vector k ∈ K ∈ R4 where kt = (t, dt, yt, ωt),31 and
ωt ∈ <N+1 is a vector of indices s.t. wi,t = 1 if i is the incumbent at period t and 0 otherwise ∀i = 1, .., N + 1.
Output yt evolves exogenously, dt is the level of debt inherited from past period, and ωt is determined by the
endogenous political markov process.











if ωit = 1 and subject to the budget constraint in (3); instead the action profile
of the opponents at t is empty: aj,t = A
j(kt) = ∅. Define an history ht ∈ Ht as ht = (a0, k0, . . . , at−1, kt−1).
A pure strategy for party i as incumbent I at time t is a function
σi,t : Ht ×K → At
31The time index t enters in the state representation because we are focusing on finite horizon
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i.e. a mapping from the entire history and the current state space to each party actions at time t. We
define as σi = (σi,1, . . . , σi,T ) the strategy profile of party i in the finite game, and σi[t] = (σi,t, . . . , σi,T ) the
continuation strategy at time t. To be general let’s define the intertemporal utility of party i in t as a function
of the continuation strategy W (σi[t], σ−i[t]). Defining Si the set of all feasible σi, the strategy space of the
infinite game is S =
∏N+1
i=1 Si. We define the best response correspondence as:
BR(σi[t]|ht−1, kt) = {σi[t] ∈ Si[t]} ,
such that
σi[t] maximizesW (σi[t], σ−i[t]),
given σ−i[t] ∈ S−i[t].
A Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium of this game is defined as follows:
Definition 2. A Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium is a strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1 , . . . , σ
∗
N+1) ∈ S s.t. σ∗i [t] ∈
BR(σi[t]|ht−1, kt) for all (kt, ht−1), for all t and i.
In the rest of the paper we consider the more specific class of Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE), where
we restrict the strategies to be based only on payoff-relevant state, and not on the entire history of the game.
In particular a Markov strategy is a mapping σ ∈ Ŝ ⊂ S s.t. σi(k, ht−1) = σi(k) ∀ht−1 ∈ Ht−1.
Given the assumption of no discrimination and given that borrowing is completely independent from
consumption allocation, it is natural to restrict our attention to the class of Symmetric MPE. In such a case
the consumption level decided by the incumbent doesn’t change with her identity, furthermore there is no
discrimination between different groups at the opposition. As discussed in section 3.1, in such a case we can
then define the instantaneous utility evaluated in c∗(c) as U I(ct) = U i,i(c∗t ) and UO(ct) = U i,r(c∗t ). Defining
as p̄t,s the conditional probability for the party being in power at t to be in power also in s, the discounted
utility is defined as







I(ct) + (1− p̄t,s)UO(ct)
}]
(23)




1. σ∗i [t] ∈ BR(σi[t]|kt) for all kt, for all t and i,
2. ∀k, k̃ ∈ K s.t. k = (t, d, y, ω) and k̃ = (t, d, y, ω̃), where ω 6= ω̃, ⇒ σi,t(k) = σj,t(k̃) ∈ Ŝ where
ωi = ω̃j = 1.
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D Appendix: Proofs
D.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. • Part 1: (a⇔ c) . Using equations (10) and (11), the RHS of the Euler equation in (9), can be
written as: pU I′(y − (1 + r)d2)+



















































where we have defined γ =
(
pθ + (1− p) 1−θN
)
. Since, θ ≥ (N + 1)−1, then γ ≤ θ.
Similarly, the LHS of the Euler equation in (9) is:
U I
′






















∂c can be derived by applying the implicit function theorem on the optimal sharing rule


















From this expression it is clear that 0 ≤ ∂c
I
∂c ≤ 1. In the following, we omit to make explicit the
dependency of ψ from aggregate consumption. Let’s now evaluate the Euler Equation above at d∗2,
which is the solution of the benchmark (transparent and no-conflict) economy, i.e.
U I
′
(y − (1 + r) d1 + d∗2) =
 pU I′(y − (1 + r)d∗2)+
+ (1− p)UO′(y − (1 + r)d∗2)










we can use the expressions for the LHS and RHS derived above and we can then eliminate the time
subscripts. Since the utility function is concave, then we have that political conflict implies incentive






















which can be rearranged as:






























This inequality is satisfied if and only if θ > ψ.






































Since θ ≥ (N + 1)−1, the condition is satisfied if the term in squared brackets is negative. Notice that
this condition is equivalent to the one used in (25). Hence, as before, by using the optimal sharing rule
in (8) we have that the condition is satisfied if and only if θ ≥ ψ.
• Part 3: (c⇔ d). Condition c states that: θ ≥ ∂c
I
∂c . Applying the implicit function theorem on the



















Using the definition: cO = c−c
I
N and the fact that u























D.2 Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. Consider the optimal sharing rule in equation (8). Applying the inverse of the marginal utility function










































Labeling some terms for convenience, we obtain:
h (θ)︸︷︷︸
κ1


































Since ψ is only a function of parameters of the model, then the utility function u(c) satisfies the PSR property.
D.3 Proof of Corollary 3








In particular the inverse of the marginal utility of HARA utility can be written as:










σ r − s.





















Hence, any HARA utility function satisfies the PSR property.
D.4 Proof of Corollary 4
Proof. • Part (a). Let us begin with part (a) of the corollary. In case of CRRA utility, it can be easily
checked that the sharing rule is the following cI = ψc. In fact, by using equation (24) considering that
u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ and by using the optimal sharing rule in (8), we have that c








































which holds for σ ≥ 1 and is satisfied with strictly inequality for σ > 1. Notice that in the log case
(σ = 1), we have equality, i.e. θ = ψ.
• Part (c). The result follows from part (b) above and from parts (a) and (c) of Proposition 1.
D.5 Proof of Corollary 5
Proof. At the optimal level of debt d̃∗2, the Euler equation in (9) is satisfied, i.e.:
θψu′
(


















cO(y − d̃∗2(1 + r)))
)
,
where we have used the expression for the Euler equation as derived in the proof D.1, and the definition of
γ =
(
pθ + (1− p) 1−θN
)













































































The denominator is negative because of the concavity of the utility function. Also, the first term in the
numerator is positive, ∂γ∂p > 0, whenever θ > (N + 1)
−1. The term in brackets at the numerator is negative
whenever θ > ψ, as can be easily seen by optimal sharing rule in (8). By assumption, U I
′
(c) ≤ UO′(c), which
indeed implies that θ > ψ, by Proposition 1. Hence, ∂d̃2∂p < 0, which means that an increase in p reduces
saving incentive. Finally, notice that if p = 1, then γ = θ, which is independent of p. Therefore ∂d̃2∂p |p=1 = 0,
and the Euler equation of the problem coincides with the Euler equation of the frictionless economy in 6.
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D.6 Sufficient conditions for the solution of FOC to be a global
maximum
In this section we provides the sufficient conditions on the probability function p(c) such that the equilib-
rium condition in (17) characterizes a unique global maximum.
Lemma 8. Assuming that the utility function satisfies the PSR property and the conditions of Proposition 1.
Then, if ∀d2
p′ (c1) < A1 (c2) (26)
p′′ (c1) < A2 (c1, c2) (27)
then the solution of the Euler Equation in equation (17) is a global solution of the problem (14)-(16). Here,
c1 = y + d2 − (1 + r) d1, c2 = y − (1 + r) d2, τ = (Nθ − 1 + θ)/N , and A1 (c2), A2 (c1, c2) are:
A1 (c2) = (1 + r)

















A2 (c1, c2) =−










































Proof. A sufficient condition for the solution of FOC to be a global maximum is that the RHS of the
Euler equation in 17 is increasing in d2 and the LHS decreasing in d2. Notice that U





































Notice that the first term in squared brackets is negative because of the concavity of the utility function. Also,
the second term in squared bracket is negative when θ > ψ, as directly implied by optimal sharing rule in (8).
Solving for p′(c1), we obtain the condition in (26). Differentiating the LHS of the Euler equation for d2:
∂LHS
∂d2
































Rearranging terms and using (26) to determine an upper bound for p′(c1), we obtain the condition (27).
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D.7 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. If conditions (26) and (27) are satisfied, the unique equilibrium d̂∗2 in a non-transparent economy is
given by equating the LHS and RHS of the Euler equation in (17). In a transparent economy, the equilibrium
d̃∗2 is given by (9). Comparing the two conditions, notice that the right-hand sides are identical; hence, the
marginal utility of savings is unchanged in the two case. Instead, the left-hand side of (17) has an additional




. With a strictly positive degree of political conflict, i.e. θ > 1N+1 ,
that term is strictly positive if p′(c1) > 0. That means that with a positive degree of lack of transparency, the
marginal utility of consuming is larger than in a transparent economy. Therefore, it follows that d̃∗2 > d̂
∗
2.
D.8 Proof of Corollary 7
Proof. Consider the solution d∗2 of the frictionless benchmark model that solves equation (6). Recall that d
∗
2








2 . Then, defining z the difference
between RHS and LHS evaluated at d∗2. z represents the difference between saving incentives and consuming






























































Differentiating, we have that ∂z∂α < 0. Since z is monotone, for a large enough α then z < 0, which means
that the solution in a non-transparent economy with political conflict implies larger borrowing incentives than
the one in the frictionless economy.
D.9 The log-utility case with linear probability
In the log utility case we have already seen that there is no saving incentive for any level of θ when the




(c) = 1/c. It is easy
to notice also that U I(c)− UO(c) = τ(2θ − 1) [log θ − log(1− θ)]. The Euler Equation (17) becomes:
(y + d1)
−1 + p′(d1)βτ(2θ − 1) [log θ − log(1− θ)] = (y − d1(1 + r))−1.
In the linear probability case, i.e. p′(d1) = α, the optimal level of debt solves:
(y + d1)
(y − d1(1 + r))
= 1 + (y + d1)αβτ [log θ − log(1− θ)] (28)
In a non-transparent economy, α > 0, the RHS of this equation is always greater than 1. Then d̃1 that satisfies
(28) is always positive. This implies that as far as α > 0 we have borrowing in this economy. Therefore, the
threshold level for α that implies more borrowing incentives than in frictionless case is zero, in the log-utility
case. We can also prove a more general statement: with CRRA utility function and with linear reelection
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probability, the threshold level for α, ᾱ s.t. when α > ᾱ we have borrowing incentives with respect to the
frictionless economy is independent from θ.
E Appendix: Equilibrium Debt and Non-linear Proba-
bility
Here we consider the following non-linear probability function: We assume that the probability of being
re-elected is represented by the following functional form:
p(c) = atan
(







Figure 6 visualizes this probability function for different parameter values. Here, α affects the sensitivity
(slope) of the probability function, whereas γ determines its level. By increasing α the probability becomes
steeper around the flex. When α is very large the probability function is close to a step function. If γ is
zero, the function is centered in c̄. Adopting the function in (29) we assume that voters are more sensitive to
economic conditions at the flex point. The flex point of the curve is shifted to the left (right) with respect
to c̄ when γ > 0(< 0). This function is bounded between 0 and 1 for any realization of consumption. The
calibration of the model is as presented in section 3.7. In Figure 7 we plot the equilibrium level of debt for
different combinations of θ and α in a 2-period model with CRRA utility function. In Table 10 we report the
average equilibrium level of debt for different combinations of θ and α in a T-period model (with T=2250).
Figure 6: Non-linear Probability function
























Note: In this figure we display of the probability function in equation (29) for different pairs of sensitivity (α) and
the level parameter (γ).
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Figure 7: Equilibrium Debt, Retrospective Voting, and Political Friction:
Non-linear Probability






























Note: This figure plots the equilibrium level of debt in a 2-period economy when assuming CRRA utility function
and non-linear probability, for different values of degree of retrospective voting (α, x-axis) and degree of political
friction, θ. The blue-solid line is associated to a low degree of political friction (θ=0.6), the black-dotted line and
the red-triangle-marked line are associated to moderate degrees of political friction ((θ=0.7 and 0.8, respectively),
and the pink-circle-marked line is associated to a high degree of political friction (θ=0.8).
Table 10: Equilibrium Level of Debt in a T -period economy: Non-linear Probability
Lack of Transparency
No: α = 0 Medium: α = 1 High: α = 5
Conflict
No: θ=0.5 0 0 0
Medium: θ=0.7 -4.3 -0.2 23.3
High: θ=0.9 -4.8 -1.2 256.7
Note: In this table we report the average level of debt (in percentage) in a T -period economy, with T = 2250, when
assuming CRRA utility function and non-linear probability, for different values of degree of retrospective voting (α,
x-axis) and degree of political friction, θ. Negative values denote savings.
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